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Abstract
In this note, we observe a safety violation in Zyzzyva [7, 9, 8] and a liveness violation in FaB [14, 15].
To demonstrate these issues, we require relatively simple scenarios, involving only four replicas, and one
or two view changes. In all of them, the problem is manifested already in the first log slot.
1 Introduction
A landmark solution in achieving replication with Byzantine fault tolerance has been the Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (PBFT) work by Castro and Liskov [3, 4]. Since the PBFT publication, there has been a
stream of works aiming to improve the efficiency of PBFT protocols. One strand of these works revolves
around optimism [10, 14, 15, 7, 9, 8, 5, 2]. In this strand, the focus is on providing a fast common case
(i.e., when there are no link or server failures). In other cases, optimistic solutions fall back to some backup
implementation with strong progress guarantees.
In this note, we observe that several key works in the “optimistic strand” do not deal with optimism
correctly. In particular, we first present in §2 safety violations in Zyzzyva [7, 9, 8]. We then demonstrate
in §3 how being “overly safe” gets FaB [14, 15] stuck. To demonstrate these issues, we require relatively
simple scenarios, involving only four replicas, and one or two view changes. In all of them, the problem is
manifested already in the first log slot.
We also briefly observe below that in other fast Byzantine replication solutions, an optimistic track is
not fully intertwined with a regular protocol, hence they are less fast.
It therefore appears that the challenge posed in [12] of providing Byzantine Fast Paxos is left open:
“Fast Paxos can also be generalized to a Fast Byzantine Paxos algorithm that requires only two
message delays between proposal and learning in the absence of collisions. (However, a single
malicious proposer can by itself create a collision.)” [12]
That is, none of the fast Byzantine agreement works we are aware of provides a solution that simultane-
ously addresses (i) optimal step-complexity, (ii) optimal resilience, (iii) safety against failures of less than a
third of the system, and (iv) progress during periods of partial synchrony.
Our team has worked out a full solution, and will publish a follow up to this report in the near future.
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Preliminaries
The focus of this work is providing state-machine-replication (SMR) for n replicas, f of which can be
Byzantine faulty. An unbounded set of clients may form requests and submit them to replicas. We refer
to members of the system, replicas or clients, as nodes. The communication among nodes is authenticated,
reliable, but asynchronous; that is, we assume that a message sent from a correct node to another correct
node is signed and eventually arrives.
At the core of SMR is a protocol for deciding on a growing log of operation requests by clients, satisfying
the following properties:
Agreement If two correct replicas commit decisions at log position s, then the decisions are the same.
Validity If a correct replica commits a decision at some log position, then it was requested (and signed) by
some client.
Liveness If some correct client submits a request, and the system is eventually partially-synchronous [6],
then eventually the replicas commit some decision.
View Change
The solutions we discuss employ a classical framework that revolves around an explicit ranking among
proposals via view numbers.
Replicas all start with an initial view, and progress from one view to the next. They accept requests and
respond to messages only in their current view.
In each view there is a single designated leader. In a view, zero or more decisions may be reached. This
strategy separates safety from liveness: It maintains safety even if the system exhibits arbitrary communi-
cation delays and again up to f Byzantine failures; it provides progress during periods of synchrony.
If a sufficient number of replicas suspect that the leader is faulty, then a view change occurs and a new
leader is elected. The mechanism to trigger moving to a higher view is of no significance for safety, but
it is crucial for liveness. On the one hand, replicas must not be stuck in a view without progress; on the
other hand, they must not move to a higher view capriciously, preventing any view from making progress.
Hence, a replica moves to a higher view if either a local timer expires, or if it receives new view suggestions
from f + 1 replicas. Liveness relies on having a constant fraction of the views with a correct leader, whose
communication with correct replicas is timely, thus preventing f + 1 replicas from expiring.
Dealing with leader replacement is the pinnacle of both safety and liveness. A core aspect in forming
agreement against failures is the need for new leaders to safely adopt previous leader values. The reason is
simple, it could be that a previous leader has committed a decision, so the only safe thing to do is adopt his
value.
In the prevailing solutions for the benign settings (DLS [6], Paxos [11], VR [16], Raft [17]), leader
replacement is done by reading from a quorum of n − f replicas and choosing the value with the maximal
view 1 number. Note that n− f captures a requirement that the quorum intersects every leader quorum in
previous views (not only the most recent one). It is crucial to take into consideration how leader quorums
of multiple previous views interplay. Choosing the value with the maximal view number is crucial because
there may be multiple conflicting values and choosing an arbitrarily value is not always a safe decision.
A similar paradigm holds in PBFT [3, 4]. The new leader needs to read from a quorum of n− f replicas
and choose a value with the maximal view number. Different from the benign case, in the Byzantine settings,
uniqueness is achieved by using enlarged, Byzantine quorums [13]. Byzantine quorums guarantee intersection
not just in any node but in a correct node.
In Byzantine settings, a correct node also needs to prove a decision value to a new leader. This is done in
PBFT2 by adding another phase before a decision. The first phase ensure uniqueness via prepare messages
from n−f nodes. In the second phase, nodes send a commit-certificate consisting of n−f prepare messages.
1In DLS, the term phase is used, and in Paxos, ballot.
2We refer here to the PBFT version with signed messages [3].
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A decision can be reached when n−f nodes have sent a commit-certificate. The two-phase scheme guarantees
that if there is a decision, there is a correct node that passes a commit-certificate to the next view.
Sacrificing Resilience
The extra PBFT phase may be avoided by somewhat sacrificing resilience and using n = 5f + 1, as in
FaB [14, 15], Zyzzyva5 [7], and Q/U [1]. Here, the intersection between a potential decision quorum and a
view-change quorum has 2f + 1 correct nodes, enough to provide both uniqueness and transfer of value.
Kursawe’s Solution
Addressing a much more limited scope, Kursawe provided in 2002 a simple black box technique to transform
any Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement (ABA) protocol (with a sufficiently strong validity property) into
a consensus protocol that has an optimistic fast path [10]. It works as follows.
There are two possible commit tracks, and they may be combined (some nodes commit in the fast, some
not). In the fast track, a node decides if all nodes prepare an identical value. In the fall-back track, any
Byzantine agreement protocol is invoked, where nodes use their prepare values as initial inputs. The only
requirement from the agreement protocol is that it satisfies the following validity property:
Byzantine validity: If all correct nodes start with the same input v, then the decision must be v.
This succinct solution framework is (almost trivially) correct. However, the recovery stage does not
utilize the prepare steps which were already performed in the fast track. Hence, whereas the fast track is
fast, the fall-back track is not optimal.
Additionally, as we already noted, it addresses a problem of a much more limited scope: It solves only a
single-shot consensus; it does not address state replication (execution) at all.
FaB
FaB [14, 15] extends Kursawe’s solution in several ways. First, the prepare messages from the fast track
are input to the recovery phase, thus reducing the number of steps in recovery mode. In this way, the
FaB recovery mode has the same overall cost as standard PBFT. Second, FaB extends the treatment to a
parameterized failure model of n = 3f + 2t + 1. Thus, by appropriately increasing the system size, fast
termination is achieved despite up to t non-leader Byzantine failures, whereas safety is guaranteed against
f .
To achieve these enhancements, FaB cannot employ a Byzantine agreement protocol for recovery as a
“black-box”. Unfortunately, opening the recovery agreement protocol and incorporating the consensus steps
into the FaB framework resulted in the omission we surface here (see §3).
Zyzzyva
Zyzzyva borrows from FaB the method for efficiently intertwining the optimistic fast track with the recovery
track. It enhances the approach in a number of dimensions. Zyzzyva provides a state replication protocol,
whereas FaB is a single shot consensus solution. Zyzzyva employs speculation in the execution of state
updates, allowing a high throughput pipeline of state-machine replication, which is out of the FaB scope.
Finally, a new leader in Zyzzyva cannot get “stuck” choosing a safe value as in FaB (§3). Unfortunately, the
view-change protocol in Zyzzyva fails to provide safety against a faulty leader, as described in §2.
Upright
The Zyzzyva view-change protocol has been employed in UpRight [5], which also incorporates the parame-
terized failure model of n = 3f + 2t+ 1 from FaB. The goal of UpRight is to build an engineering-strength
BFT engine. The UpRight paper does not provide a full description of the algorithm, and rather indicates
that it adopts these two previous solutions.
3
The Next 700 BFT Protocols
In The Next 700 BFT Protocols, Aublin et al. [2] provide a principled approach to view-change in BFT
protocols. Their approach switches not only leaders, but also entire regimes, in order to respond to adaptive
system conditions. One node of the 700 BFT protocol family is AZyzzyva, a protocol that combines the
speculative (fast) path of Zyzzyva in a protocol called Zlight with a recovery protocol, e.g., PBFT. If Zlight
fails to make progress, it switches to a new view that executes PBFT for a fixed number k of log slots. In this
sense, AZyzzyva falls back to the approach of Kursawe [10], while extending it to a pipeline of state-machine
commands and implementing a replicated state-machine. Indeed, Azyzzyva is simple and principled, and
it is not vulnerable to the safety violations of Zyzzyva exposed here (§2). At the same time, the Azyzzyva
recovery path requires more steps than the two-phase protocol of Zyzzyva. Additionally, Azyzzyva requires
to wait for a commit decision (of k slots) to switch back from PBFT to Zlight.
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2 Revisiting the Zyzzyva View-Change
2.1 Introduction
The Zyzzyva [7, 9, 8] has two commit paths. A two-phase path that resembles PBFT and a fast path.
The fast path does not have commit messages, and a client commits a decision by seeing 3f + 1 prepare
messages3. The optimistic mode is coupled with a recovery mode that guarantees progress in face of failures.
The recovery mode intertwines the PBFT two-phase steps into the protocol.
Quoting from [8], ”Fast agreement and speculative execution have profound effects on Zyzzyvas view
change subprotocol.”
Indeed, in Zyzzyva, a possible decision value is transferred across views in two possible ways, correspond-
ing to the two decision tracks of the protocol (fast and two-phase): In the fast track, a possible decision value
manifests itself as f + 1 prepare messages. In the two-phase track, it manifests itself as a commit-certificate
(as in PBFT). Combining the two, Zyzzyva prefers a commit-certificate over f +1 prepares; and among two
commit-certificates, it prefers the one with the longer request-log.
Here we show that either one of these rules may lead to violating safety.
The omissions are quite subtle, because unless a leader equivocates, a commit-certificate will not conflict
with fast-paths of higher views.
Likewise, unless a leader equivocates, the log can only grow from one view to the next. Hence, in benign
executions, higher views have longer (or at least non-decreasing4) sequence of commands, and the notions
of highest view and longest request-log will be the same.
Nevertheless, we show that both these strategies do not provide safety, and permit the scenarios we
surface here, where Zyzzyva breaks safety.
2.2 A Skeletal Overview of Zyzzyva
We start with an overview of Zyzzyva. Our description is merely skeletal, and glosses over many engineering
details: We assume that all messages are signed and are forwarded carrying their signatures; we neglect
the mechanism for checkpoint and space reclamation; and we do not optimize for messages sizes and crypto
operations. These details and optimizations are covered in the Zyzzyva paper, and are omitted here for
brevity and clarity.
As in the original paper, we break the Zyzzyva agreement protocol into three sub-protocols, a fast-track
sub-protocol, a two-phase sub-protocol, and a view-change sub-protocol.
Messages. Since we mostly adopt the notation and terminology from PBFT, we start with a quick reference
guide, mapping Zyzzyva’s message types to PBFT’s.
Client-request: A client-request (REQUEST) from a client to the leader contains some operation o, whose
semantics are completely opaque for the purpose of this discussion.
Ordering-request: A leader’s pre-prepare message is called an ordering-request (ORDER-REQ), and contains
a leader’s log of client requests ORn = (o1, ..., on). (In practice, the leader sends only the last request
and a hash of the history of prior operations; a node can request the leader to re-send any missing
operations.)
Ordering-response: When a replica accepts a valid pre-prepare request, it speculatively executes it and
sends the result in a prepare message called an ordering-response (SPEC-RESPONSE).
3Note that, the terms prepare and commit are taken from PBFT; In Zyzzyva, the leader proposal message is called ORDER-REQ
and the acknowledgements by replicas which are akin to prepare messages are called SPEC-RESPONSE.
4it seems that another, minor omission in the Zyzzyva protocol is that it does not explicitly indicate how to break ties in
case of two maximal commit-certificates, of same length
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Commit-request: A commit-request (COMMIT) from the client to the replicas includes a commit-certificate
CC, a set of 2f + 1 signed replica responses (SPEC-RESPONSE) to an (identical) ordering-request
ORn.
Commit-response: When a replica obtains a valid commit-certificate CC for ORn, it responds to client
requests in ORn with a commit message called a commit-response (LOCAL-COMMIT).
View-change: A view-change (VIEW-CHANGE) message from a replica to the leader of a new view captures
the replica’s local state.
New-view: A new-view (NEW-VIEW) message from the leader of a new view contains a set P of view-
change messages the leader collected, which serves as a new-view proof. It includes a new ordering
request Gn = (o1, ..., on).
The fast-track sub-protocol. Zyzzyva contains a fast-track protocol in which a client learns the result
of a request in only three message latencies, and only a linear number of crypto operations. It works as
follows.
A client sends a request o to the current leader. The current leader extends its local log with the request
o to ORn, and sends a pre-prepare (ordering-request) carrying ORn. We did not say how a leader’s local
log is initialized. Below we discuss the protocol for a leader to pick an initial log when starting a new view.
A replica accepts a pre-prepare from the leader of the current view if it has valid format, and it extends
any previous pre-prepare from this leader. Upon accepting a pre-prepare, a replica extends its local log to
ORn It speculatively executes it, and sends the result directly to the client in a prepare message.
A decision is reached on ORn in view v in the fast track when 3f +1 distinct replicas have sent a prepare
message for it.
The two-phase sub-protocol. If progress is stalled, then a client waits to collect a commit-certificate,
a set of 2f + 1 prepare responses for ORn. Then the client sends a commit-request carrying the commit-
certificate to the replicas. A replica responds to a valid commit-request with a commit message.
A decision is reached on ORn in view v in the two-phase track when 2f + 1 distinct replica have sent a
commit message for it.
The view-change protocol. The core mechanism in Zyzzyva for transferring safe values across views
is for a new Zyzzyva leader to collect a set P of view-change messages from a quorum of 2f + 1 replicas.
Each replica sends a view-change message containing the replica’s local state: Its local request-log, and the
commit-certificate with the highest view number it responded to with a commit message, if any.
The leader processes the set P as follows.
1. Initially, it sets a base log G to an empty log.
2. If any view-change message contains a valid commit-certificate, then it selects the one with the longest
request-log ORn and copies ORn to G.
3. If f + 1 view-change messages contain the same request-log OR′
m
, then it extends the tail of G with
requests from OR′
m
. (If there are two OR′
m
logs satisfying this, one is selected arbitrarily.)
4. Finally, it pads G with null request entries up to the length of the longest log of any valid prepare.
The leader sends a new-view message to all the replica. The message includes the new view number v+1,
the set P of view-change messages the leader collected as a proof for new-view (v + 1), and a request-log
G. A replica accepts a new-view message if it is valid, and adopts the leader log. It may need to roll back
speculatively executed requests, and process new ones.
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2.3 Breaking Safety: First Scenario
We now proceed to demonstrate that the view-change mechanism in Zyzzyva does not guarantee safety. The
overview of Zyzzyva we provided above should suffice to understand the scenarios below; for precise detail
and notation of the Zyzzyva protocol, the reader is referred to [9].
Our first scenario demonstrates that the criterion for combining fast-track decision with two-phase de-
cision may lead to a safety violation. In particular, prioritizing commit-certificate over f + 1 prepares, as
done in Zyzzyva, is not always correct.
Our scenario requires four replicas i1, i2, i3, i4, of which one, i1, is Byzantine. It proceeds in 3 views,
and arrives at a conflicting decision on the first log position.
View 1: Creating a commit-certificate for (a).
1. Two clients c1, c2 provide a leader i1 of view 1 with well-formed requests (REQUEST) a and b, respectively.
2. In view 1, the leader i1 sends to replicas i2 and i3 a pre-prepare (ORDER-REQ) for a.
3. The leader i1 (Byzantine) equivocates and sends replica i4 a conflicting pre-prepare for b.
4. Replicas i2 and i3 accept the leader’s well-formed pre-prepare, and speculatively execute a. They
obtain a speculative result and send it in a prepare response (SPEC-RESPONSE) to c1.
5. Client c1 collects prepares from i1, i2 and i3 for the request-log (a). These responses constitute a
commit-certificate, denoted cert.
Then the client expires waiting for additional responses. It sends a commit-request (COMMIT) for (a)
that includes the commit-certificate cert. The commit-request reaches only i1.
View 2: Deciding (b).
1. All further messages are delayed, forcing the system to go through a view change.
2. In view 2, the leader i2 collects view-change messages (VIEW-CHANGE) from itself, from i1 and from i4
as follow:
• Replica i2 sends its local log (a).
• Replica i4 sends its local log (b):
• Replica i1 (which is Byzantine) joins i4 and sends a request-log (b).
Based on these view-change messages, i2 constructs a new request-log G consisting of (b), and sends it
in a new-view message (NEW-VIEW) to replicas.
3. Every replica accepts the leader i2 well-formed new-view message. Upon accepting it, each replica
zeros its local log (undoing a, if needed). All replicas adopt the leader request-log (b) and speculatively
execute b. They obtain a speculative result and send it in a response (SPEC-RESPONSE) to c2.
4. The client c2 of b collects speculative-responses from all replicas, and b becomes successfully com-
mitted at log position 1.
View 3: Choosing the wrong commit-certificate.
1. All further messages are delayed, forcing the system to go through a view change.
2. In view 3, the leader i3 collects view-change messages (VIEW-CHANGE) from itself, from i1 and from i4
as follow:
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• Replica i1, which is Byzantine, hides the value it prepared in view 2, and sends commit-certificate
cert (see above) for (a).
• Replicas i3 and i4 send their local logs (b).
Based on these view-change messages, i3 chooses cert, the commit-certificate, and adopts it. It con-
structs a new request-log G consisting of requests (a), and sends it in a new-view message (NEW-VIEW)
to replicas.
3. Each replica accepts the leader i3 well-formed new-view message. Upon accepting it, replicas zero
their local logs, undoing b as needed. Then they speculatively execute a, send the result, and a
becomes successfully committed at log position 1.
2.4 Breaking Safety: Second Scenario
The second scenario demonstrates that the criterion for combining two-phase decisions from different views
may lead to a safety violation. In particular, prioritizing the longest commit-certificate, as done in Zyzzyva,
is not always correct.
Our second scenario again requires four replicas i1, i2, i3, i4, of which one, i1, is Byzantine. It proceeds
in 3 views, and arrives at a conflicting decision on the first log position. In order to construct commit-
certificates of different lengths, it utilizes four operation requests, a1 by client c1, a2 by c2, b1 by c3, and b2
by c4.
View 1: Creating a commit-certificate for (a1, a2).
1. Four clients c1, ..., c4 provide a leader i1 of view 1 with well-formed requests (REQUEST) for a1, a2, b1,
and b2, respectively.
2. In view 1, the leader i1 sends to replicas i2 and i3 two pre-prepare messages (ORDER-REQ). The first
one is for a1 at log position 1. The second one is for a2 at log position 2, succeeding a1.
3. The leader i1 (Byzantine) equivocates and sends replica i4 two conflicting pre-prepare requests. The
first one is for b1 at log position 1. The second one is for b2 at log position 2 succeeding b1.
4. Replicas i2 and i3 accept the relevant leader’s well-formed pre-prepares, and speculatively execute
a1 followed by a2. They obtain speculative results and send each result in a corresponding prepare
response (SPEC-RESPONSE) to its requesting client.
5. The client c2 of a2 collects prepares from i1, i2 and i3 for the request-log (a1, a2). These responses
constitute a commit-certificate, denoted cert1.
Then the client expires waiting for additional responses. It sends a commit-request (COMMIT) for (a1, a2)
that includes the commit-certificate cert1. The commit-request reaches only i3.
View 2: Deciding (b1).
1. All further messages are delayed, forcing the system to go through a view change.
2. In view 2, the leader i2 collects view-change messages (VIEW-CHANGE) from itself, from i1 and from i4
as follow:
• Replica i2 sends its local log (a1, a2).
• Replica i4 sends its local log (b1, b2).
• Replica i1 (which is Byzantine) joins i4 and sends a request-log (b1, b2).
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Based on these view-change messages, i2 constructs a new request-log G consisting of (b1, b2), and
sends it in a new-view message (NEW-VIEW) to replicas.
3. Each replica among i1, i2 and i4 accepts the leader i2 well-formed new-view message. Upon accepting
it, replica i zeros its local log (undoing a1, a2 as needed), and adopts the leader request-log (b1, b2). It
first proceeds to speculatively execute b1, obtains a speculative result, and sends it in in a response
(SPEC-RESPONSE) to c3.
4. The client c3 of b1 collects speculative-responses from i1, i2 and i4 for the request-log (b1). These
responses constitute a commit-certificate, denoted cert2.
Then the client expires waiting for additional responses. It sends a commit-request (COMMIT) for (b1)
that includes the commit-certificate cert2.
5. Upon receiving the well-formed commit-request, replicas i1, i2, and i4 respond to client c3 with a
commit message (LOCAL-COMMIT).
6. The client collects these commit messages and b1 becomes successfully committed at log position
1.
View 3: Choosing the wrong, maximal commit-certificate.
1. All further messages are delayed, forcing the system to go through a view change.
2. In view 3, the leader i3 collects view-change messages (VIEW-CHANGE) from itself, from i1 and from i4
as follow:
• Replica i3 sends commit-certificate cert1 (see above) for (a1, a2).
• Replica i4 sends commit-certificate cert2 (see above) for (b1), and its local log (b1, b2).
• Replica i1 (Byzantine) can join either one, or even send an view-change message with an empty
log.
Based on these view-change messages, i3 chooses cert1, the commit-certificate with the longest request-
log, and adopts it. It constructs a new request-log G consisting of (a1, a2), and sends it in a new-view
message (NEW-VIEW) to replicas.
3. Each replica accepts the leader i3 well-formed new-view message. Upon accepting it, replicas zero
their local logs, undoing b1 as needed. Then they speculatively execute a1, send the result, and
a1 becomes successfully committed at log position 1.
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3 Revisiting the FaB View-Change
3.1 Introduction
The Zyzzyva protocol borrows from an earlier work called FaB (Fast Byzantine Consensus) [14, 15]. FaB
introduces a family of Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement (ABA) solutions exhibiting reduced latency when
the system is behaving synchronously. In particular, it constructs a parameterized variant for n ≥ 3f+2t+1,
where t ≤ f , that has optimal synchronous latency when no more than t non-leader members fail. Putting
t = 0, we obtain a similar setting to Zyzzyva, and the guarantee of a fast execution in fail-free runs. In this
paper for simplicity we focus on the case where n is minimal for a given f and t (so n = 3f + 2t+ 1).
Briefly, the core mechanism for transferring safe values across views revolves around a “progress certifi-
cate”. The certificate consists of signed new-view messages from a quorum of n − f replicas to the leader
of a new view. A new-view message from a replica contains the last pre-proposed message accepted by this
replica, and the last commit-certificate it received. A progress certificate is said to “vouch for” a value v if
it is safe for the leader of the new view to pre-propose v.
As we describe below, there is a bug in Parameterized FaB such that the progress certificate may vouch
for no value at all, resulting in the protocol getting stuck.
Zyzzyva borrows from FaB the idea of an optimistic fast track, and enhances the approach in a number of
dimensions. Zyzzyva provides a state replication protocol, whereas FaB is a single shot consensus solution.
Zyzzyva employs speculation in the execution of state updates, allowing a high throughput pipeline of
state-machine replication, which is out of the FaB scope. Finally, Zyzzyva includes view-numbers in the
view-change protocol, which prevent the “stuck” situation in FaB that we expose here.
3.2 A Skeletal Overview of the FaB Protocol Family
Martin and Alvisi introduce Fast Byzantine Consensus (FaB) in [14, 15], a family of protocols parameterized
by various resilience assumptions. The papers use the Paxos terminology to model roles: proposers, acceptors,
and learners. And it employs proposal numbers to enumerate proposals. We will adhere to the Zyzzyva (and
PBFT) terminology, and translate those to leaders, replicas, and view-numbers.
FaB has two variants. The first FaB variant works with n = 5f + 1 replicas, among which leaders are
chosen to drive agreement in views. We will refer to this variant as FaB5. The second one is parameterized
with n = 3f + 2t+ 1, and we refer to it as PFaB.
5f + 1 FaB. The basic FaB5 protocol is an easy two-step protocol. A leader pre-proposes a value to
replicas, who each accept one value per view and respond with a prepare message. A decision is reached in
FaB5 when 4f + 1 replicas send a prepare response for it. During periods of synchrony, FaB5 is guaranteed
to complete through these two easy steps, despite up to f arbitrary (Byzantine) non-leader failures.
If progress is stalled, replicas elect a new leader and move to a new view. The core mechanism in FaB5
for transferring safe values across views is a progress certificate. A progress-certificate consists of signed new-
view messages (REP) from a quorum of 4f + 1 replicas to the leader of a new view. A new-view message
from a replica contains the value in a prepare message sent by this replica.
A progress-certificate is said to vouch for a value v if there does not exist a set of 2f + 1 new-view
messages with some identical accepted value v′, where v′ 6= v.
Intuitively, the reason FaB5 is safe is because if a decision is reached in a view, then 3f+1 correct replicas
prepared it. If the next view is activated, then in every progress-certificate quorum, 2f + 1 of the quorum
will prevent vouching for any conflicting proposal. Hence, no correct replica will ever override an accepted
value.
The reason FaB5 is live is because there cannot be two sets of 2f +1 vouching against each other’s value.
Hence, there always exists a safe value to propose.
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Parameterized FaB. The second FaB variant is called Parameterized FaB (PFaB for short). PFaB borrow
the idea of an optimistic fast execution track from a long line of works on early-stopping consensus, and in
particular, from the optimistic asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol of Kursawe in [10].
PFaB is parameterized with n = 3f + 2t + 1, where t ≤ f . It works in two tracks, a fast track and a
recovery track. The fast track is the same as FaB5, allowing a decision in two steps if n− t replicas accept a
leader proposal. The fast track is guaranteed to complete in periods of synchrony with a correct leader and
up to t Byzantine replicas.
Different from FaB5, Parameterized FaB does not necessarily guarantee fast progress even in periods of
synchrony, if the parameter t threshold of failures is exceeded. That is, although PFaB is always safe despite
up to f Byzantine failures, it is not always fast. The fast track is guaranteed to complete during periods of
synchrony in two steps only if the number of actual Byzantine failures does not exceed t.
If progress is stalled, PFaB allows progress via a recovery protocol, which is essentially PBFT (adapted
to n = 3f + 2t+ 1).
More precisely, in PFaB, the recovery track revolves around forming a commit-certificate called a commit-
proof. When replicas accept a leader proposal, in addition to sending prepare messages (ACCEPTED) to the
leader, replicas also send signed prepare messages to each other. When a replica receives in a view (n−f− t)
prepare messages for the same value, it forms a commit-certificate, and sends it in a commit message
(COMMITPROOF) to other replicas.
A decision is reached if either n− t prepare messages are sent (for the same value), or (n− f − t) commit
messages are sent (for the same value).
As in Fab5, the core mechanism in PFaB for transferring safe values across views is a progress certificate
containing new-view messages (REP) from a quorum of n − f replicas. Differently, in PFaB, a new-view
message from a replica contains both the last value it sent in a prepare message, and the last commit-
certificate it sent in a commit message.
In PFaB, a progress-certificate is said to vouch for a value v if there does not exist a set of f+t+1 new-view
messages with an identical prepare value v′ such that v′ 6= v; and there does not exist any commit-certificate
with value v′ such that v′ 6= v.
3.3 Getting Stuck
In this section, we demonstrate that a progress-certificate may contain f + t + 1 new-view messages with
some prepare value, and a commit-certificate with a different value. This causes PFaB to get stuck because
there is no value vouched-for by the certificate, hence new leaders cannot make any valid proposal.
For a scenario, we set f = 1, t = 0, n = 3f + 2t + 1 = 4. Denote the replicas by i1, i2, i3, i4, one of
whom, say i1, is Byzantine. The scenario goes through one view change.
View 1:
1. Leader i1 (Byzantine) pre-proposes value A to i2, i3.
2. i1, i2, and i3 accept the proposal and send prepare (ACCEPTED) messages. Their prepare messages reach
only i2, and i2 forms a commit-certificate (COMMITPROOF) for the value A.
3. Meanwhile, the leader i1 equivocates and pre-proposes B to i4.
4. All further prepare messages other than those sent to i1 are delayed. The delay triggers a view change.
View 2:
1. The new leader i2 collects a progress certificate consisting of new-view messages (REP) from a quorum
of 3 replicas (including itself):
• from i1, the new-view message contains the value B, and no commit-certificate.
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• from i2, the new-view message contains the value A, and a commit-certificate for it.
• from i4, the new-view message contains the value B, and no commit-certificate.
Now we are stuck. This progress certificate contains 2 messages (from i1,i4) with prepare value B. Hence,
the certificate does not vouch for A. At the same time, it contains a commit-certificate (from i2) with value
A. Hence, it does not vouch for B either.
The PFaB paper includes an argument that all process certificates vouch for at least one value (Lemma
7), but unfortunately it has a mistake.
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